DNScurve, with all due respect, never had a chance. It didn’t have a chance when I last talked about it a year ago. It’s downright moribund today.
Sure, on a technical level it has some really cool technology—in particular, I really like the (2^(255)) - 19 curve it uses for cryptography; a “stock” DNS packet can only fit 512 bytes of information (we can make the packet about 1280 bytes in size if we use EDNS), so a public key cryptographic primitive that offers strong security without needing to push around 3072-bit RSA signatures (the approximate size needed with RSA to get the same level of security as DJB’s “25519” curve) is very appealing.
But, unfortunately, standards are not judged solely on their technical merits. They are also judged on how well the people who work on the standards get along and are willing to make compromises.
DJB, as far as I can tell, was never willing to work with other people on DNScurve. He wanted it to be an end-to-end DJB-exclusive invention: His own “25519” curve for public key cryptography, his own Salsa20 stream cipher for encryption (a nice enough cipher, but it uses 32-bit words everywhere and doesn’t have a mode using 64-bit words), and his own “Poly1305”.
To top it off, DJB didn’t even implement a reference implementation of DNScurve. He wasn’t even willing to walk far enough outside of his ivory tower to make an implementation, make said implementation public, and allow people to see how it ran in the real world.
And, indeed, no one else implemented DNScurve either. The most notable implementation of DNScurve was GbDNS, but that was replaced by something called “QRP” a year ago. OpenDNS was the only other place that implemented DNScurve, but they’re now looking to implement DNSSEC.
DNScurve also suffered from being a solution looking for a problem. The only real issue DNScurve solved was the problem of being able to sniff DNS traffic and spoofing replies based on the traffic seen. It didn’t solve the problem of an upstream DNS server sending spoofed traffic. Quite bluntly, this is a problem OpenDNS’ current business model doesn’t want to see solved (they make their money from NX redirects and from having google.com point to their own web page), so it’s no surprise they advocated DNScurve for as long as they did.
DNSSEC, on the other hand, is already seeing wide adoption. BIND has always supported it, of course, and Unbound supports it. GbDNS also now has gone from supporting DNScurve to support DNSSEC. PowerDNS is getting DNSSEC support.
If things in my life ever change and I got a six-month paid sabbatical, I would also implement DNSSEC and make it part of Deadwood; I regret the fact I don’t have time to make a compact pure-C implementation of DNSSEC.
If you want to make a standard real, work with standards committees. I know DJB can do this; his excellent Salsa20 cipher is part of the eSTREAM portfolio (but, again, I’d like to see a 64-bit Salsa20, or, even better, a 64-bit version of Cha-Cha I would call Merengue, or even Merequetengue). It’s a shame he didn’t do the same with DNScurve. Hopefully, the 25519 curve can become a public key algorithm used in future revisions to the DNSSEC standard.